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ABSTRACT
Weanalyze a model of optimal consumption and portfolio selection in
which consumption services are generated by holding a durable good. The
durable good is illiquid in that a transaction cost must be paid when the good
is sold.It is shown that optimal consumption is not a smooth function of
wealth; it is optimal for the consumer to wait until a large change in wealth
occurs before adjusting his consumption. As a consequence, the consumption
based capital asset pricing model fails to hold. Nevertheless, it is shown that
the standard, one factor, market portfolio based capital asset pricing model
does hold in this environment.
It is shown that the optimal durable level is characterized by three
numbers (not random variables), say x, y, and z (where x < y < z). The
consumer views the ratio of consumption to wealth(c/W)as his state
variable.If this ratio is between x andz,then he does not sell the
durable. If c/Wis less than x or greater thanz,then he sells his
durable and buys a new durable of size S so that S/Wy. Thus yis
his "target" level of c/W. If the stock market moves up enough so that c/W
falls belowx,then he sells his small durable to buy a larger durable.
However, there will be many changes in the value of his wealth for which
c/W stays between x and z, and thus consumption does not change.
Numerical simulations show that small transactions costs can make
consumption changes occur very infrequently.Further, the effect of
transactions costs on the demand for risky assets is substantial.
SanfordGrossman Guy Laroque
Departmentof Economics INSEE
Princeton University Paris, FRANCE
Princeton, NJ 085441. INTRODUCTION
We analyze a model of optimal consumption and portfolio selection in which
consumption services are generated by holding a durable good.The durable
good Is Illiquld in that a transaction cost must be paid when the good is
sold.It is shown that optimal consumption is not a smooth function of
wealth; It is optimal for the consumer to wait until a large change in wealth
occurs before adjusting his consumption.As a consequence, the consumption
based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM) falls to hold. Nevertheless, It
is shown that the standard, one factor, market portfolio based capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) does hold in this environment.
In the standard model without transactions costs, and with additively
separable utility, a consumer, at an optimum, will be Indifferent between
investing a dollar and consuming goods worth a dollar. This implies that the
derivative of his indirect utility of wealth, say V'(W) will equal his
marginal utility of consumption u'(c); call this the envelope condition.
The CAPM Is based upon noting that given two assets with returns r1, and
rj.
the consumer must be Indifferent about switching a dollar from one to the
other, and this Implies that EV'(W) (r1 —r) = 0.Roughly speaking, the
CCAPM Is derived from this equation by using the envelope condition. However,
If it is costly to change the consumption flow, then it will no longer be the
case that the envelope condition holds, and this breaks the link between the
CCAPM and the CAPM.
A great deal of empirical evidence now exists in which the CCAPM is not
only statistically rejected but also in which it is shown that the CAPM
provides a better explanation for the observed risk premia on commonstocks.
There are two sorts of inadequacies that are brought out by these studies.
1First, per capita consumption does not covary very much with stock returns,
oavery high risk aversion is needed to explain the observed risk premnia of
stocks. Second, the envelope condition forces the same parameter to be used
for both intertemporal substitution and risk aversion, while the data suggests
that two parameters are needed. Both of these difficulties are avoided by
considering a model where consumption derives from Illiquld durables.
The structure and results of this paper are as follows. Section 2 states
the consumer's optimization problem. It is assumed that the level of
consumption services can be changed only by selling the existing durable
(e.g., car or house) and purchasing a new one. In selling the old durable, a
transactions cost must be paid which is proportional to the value of the
durable being sold (e.g., a commission to a real estate broker). This acts
like a fixed cost in an optimal stopping problem. The consumer can invest in
n risky assets and a risk free asset. There is no transactions cost involved
in the purchase and sale of these financial assets.1' The value of the risky
assets follow a Brownian motion, and this is the source of randomness in the
model. It is assumed that the consumer has a constant relative risk aversion
utility function over durable services.
In the absence of a transactions cost, the consumer would choose his
consumption to maintain it in a fixed proportion to his wealth; if the stock
market rises, then he increases his consumption, while If it falls, he
decreases his consumption. Needless to say, this is not an optimal policy in
the presence of a (fixed) transactions costs. It is surely suboptimal for a
person to sell his house on every day In which the stock market changes,if on
each such sale he must pay a broker a 5% transactions fee. It is thus
obvious that the covariance of a single consumer's instantaneous consumption
changes and stock returns will be zero most of the time, and hence not be
2proper measure of asset riskiness.
Section 3 provIdes a characterization of the optimal policies.It Is
shown that the optimal durable level is characterized by three numbers (not
random variables), say x, y, and z (where x <y<z).The consumer views
the ratio of consumption to wealth (c/W)as his state variable.If this
ratio is between x and z, then he does not sell the durable. If c/W Is
less than x or greater than z,then he sells his house and buys a new
house of size S so that S/W =y.Thus y is his "target° level of c/W.
If the stock market moves up enough so that c/W falls below x,then he
sells his small house to buy a larger house.However, there will be many
changes in t,.valueof his wealth for which cIW stays between x and z,
and thus consumption does not change.
Section 3 also proves that the consumer will choose a portfolio of stocks
which is mean-variance efficient. As a consequence, equilibrium in the stock
market requires that all consumers hold the market portfolio.This, of
course, implies that the standard capital asset pricing model gives the risk
premia of financial assets, i.e., an asset's mean excess return is
proportional to its covariance with the return on the market portfolio.
Finally, Section 3 discusses the extent to which transaction costs cause
the consumer to act in a more risk averse manner with regard to his holdings
of risky assets.It is shown that just after purchasing a new house, the
consumer holds a smaller percentage of his wealth in risky assets than he
would in the absence of transaction costs.This Is because a random event,
which increases his wealth, is worth less (than it would in the absence of
transactions cost), since a cost must be borne to get the consumption benefits
of the wealth increase. On the other hand, a random loss on the risky asset
is now worse because not only does consumption have to fall but a
3transaction cost also must be paid (causing consumption to fall by more than
it would have otherwise).
Section 4 presents numerical simulations of the model. It is shown that
small transactions costs can make consumption changes occur very infrequently.
Further, the effect of transactions costs on the demand for risky assets is
substantial.
Section 5 contains conclusions, and a discussion of the empirical results
of Bar-han and Blinder (1986) which bear directly on the model.
The Appendix contains proofs of all the Theorems.
42. STATEMENT OF THE CONSUMER'S OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
We assume that consumption services can be obtained only from the
possession of a durable physical asset K. This yields a continuous flow of
services to its owner and depreciates at rate over time, 0
We study a situation which departs in two main ways from the standard
consumption model. First, the physical asset comes In bulk ("houses") of
various sizes, and the services accruing to a consumer comes from the house
he lives in (the good is indivisible once bought, and there is no rental
market). Therefore, to change his consumption level beyond what Is caused
by depreciation, the consumer must sell his current house for a new one.
Second, the market for houses may operate Imperfectly, with transaction costs
due to, e.g., costs of matching buyers and sellers. We model this
imperfection by postulating that the selling price of the physical asset is a
fraction (1—X) of its value, 0A < 1 .Thecase A =0corresponds to a
perfect market. A similar description of the market for consumer durables has
been used by Flernming [1969).
In addition to the durable good, the consumer can invest his wealth into
a risk free asset and a portfolio of risky assets. We take the durable good
as the numeraire. We assume that the instantaneous return on the risk free
asset is constant and given by rf. Let be the value of the i- risky
asset (inclusive of accumulated dividends) at time t. We assume that
dbit =(dt+ dwjt) where t (Wit, W2t ...,W)is an n
dimensional brownian motion without drift, and instantaneous positive definite
covariance matrix .Let =1t'b2t 'ntand =
2' •• .Weassume that there are no transaction costs
involved in buying or selling these financial assets.
5If we let Bt' and X, respectively denote the (dollar) amount of the
risk free asset and the vector of risky assets chosen by the consumer at time
t, then his total wealth satisfies
(2.1) Kt +Bt
+t•&
where 9.Is a vector of l's. Let trepresenta time when the consumer
sells his house. In any Interval of time dt in which the consumer does not




Note that we can define dbt =(-&1f)dt+dwt
to be the vector of excess
returns on the risky assets,
-
Zrf
as the vector of mean excess





+t.dt for r(t, t +dt)
If the consumer sells his house at time r,then
(2.4) = —
whereQ refers to the level of Q just before the house sale. Note
that there Is no transactions cost In purchasing a house, and XK_ is the
loss in selling a house of size K_
We consider an infinitely lived consumer In the economy whose tastes
are represented by the expected value of an Interteniporally separableutility
function E Je'6tu(Kt)dt where 6 >0,isthe discount rate, and
K 0 ,isthe quantity of durable good held at date t .Theconsumption
service flow is taken to be proportional to the stock Kt
Given Initial conditions (Q0, K0_), the problem of the consumer is
to find non-anticipatory controls (Kt, t0) (I.e., where (Kt,Xt)
6depend only on the past values of b(t1), t't), and non-anticipatory
stopping times r(i.e.,he chooses a rule which determines for each time
t whether he should sell his house as a function of all the information he
has up to time t) which maximize expected utility subject to (2.3), (2.4)
and a no bankruptcy constraint:
(2.5) Qt—xKt0 foralit.
(Iftheconsumer meets the constraint with equality at some date t ,heis
forced to sell his house at that date, and is left with a zero consumption
from then on). We also assume that the absolute value of the fraction of
wealth invested in any asset is bounded.
Let V(Q,K) be the supremum of the expected utility that the consumer
can achieve, from the initial conditions (Q,K) .Weassume that the utility
function exhibits constant relative risk aversion, i.e.:
Kaforsome a<1 ,aO
and this enables us to reduce the problem from two state variables to a
single state variable. The case of log utility, (i.e., a=O) can be analyzed




Notethat a2 >0,and we assume that .z and rf + are strictly positive.
In the Appendix we prove:










.ThenV(Q,) is well defined and there exists
a numbeV2 >0such that
V2(Q_XK)a VQaV(Q,K)) a
Furthermore, V(Q,K) Is homogenous of degree a In (Q,K) and does not
increase when X Increases.
In all the following, we shall assume B >0(otherwise in the absence
of transaction costs, when A zo , theconsumer could achieve an infinite
expected utility). The quantity v in the above theorem is the utility the
consumer gets when his initial wealth is equal to 1 and A0 .Itis
immediate that the consumer cannot gain from an increase in transaction
costs, and therefore vQaprovides an upper bound for V(Q,K). On the
other hand, the following strategy is always available to the consumer: sell
the house now and Invest all the proceedings In a new home to be kept forever
without any Intervention on the financial market. This gives the lower bound
on V(Q,K)
Now consider a consumer at date 0 ,with
If he decides to change houses immediately, he
Therefore, If V(Q,K) >SupV(Q-AK,c) he will
C
equality holds, he will change. Consequently,
following Bellman equation:




where risthe first stopping time from date 0.
Using the homogeneity of V(Q,K) we make a change ofvariable which
8enables us to reduce the problem to one state variable .Let:
(2.8) =- x =
h(y)=K-aV(Q,K)
&=+aa r=a+rf.
Substituting Ka h(y) for V(Q,K) into the Bellman equation gives:
-t a iQ
Kah(Y) =Sup ElJ eta









Sup IT V = Sup(Y+X)—a h(y) =M
] [-,
since =Q- -AK- .Dividethrough by Ka ,apositive number, and use T t
thefact that K =KeTto get
(2.9) h(y) =SupE






(2.10) dy =• db+r(y+A—1)dt
The no bankruptcy constraint (2.5) becomes:
(2.11) 0 all t
Finally, the definition of H is:
9(2.12) M =Sup(y+A) h(y)
y
By Theorem 2.1, we have







satisfyIng (2.13), we first study the optimization problem In
to (2.10) and (2.11). ThIs is a problem where stopping occurs
the consumer receives a payoff MYa when he stops in state y.
result is an application of Krylov (1980], p.39.
Theorem 2.2: Let M be exogenously fixed satisfyIng (2.13), and let h(y;M)
denote the solution to (2.9)-(2.11) for such a given M. Then suppressing the
dependence of h(y;M) on M for notational convenience, h(y)is
continuously differentiable (except possibly at y =1-A)and
(1) If h(y) >YAM,then It Is optimal to not stop (i.e., t0),h(y)
is twice continuously differentiable except possibly at y =1-A,and
(2.14a)Sup [h'I Var dy +h'(y)Edy
-h(y)+1/a]
=0
(2.14b)where Var dy x' and Edyr(y+X—1) +x.j
(II) If h(y) =YaM,then stop (I.e., t= 0)and
(2.15) Sup [hY) Var dy +h'(y)Edy-lh(y)+1/a]
0
except possibly at the boundary points of the set (yih(y)>yaM};
(2.16) h'(y) =ay1M if h(y)YaM
10The portfolio x(y) is optimal at state y if it attains thesupremum
in (2.14).
This theorem can be understood as follows. First, from (2.9) it is
clear that h(y) since it is always feasible to set t= 0.If
h(y) >MYathen this means that t0,so (roughly speaking) by continuity,
there is a time t small enough so that we can ignore events where stopping
occurs during (O,t) and thus:
t
h(y)sup E ds +et
h(yt)
and therefore, bringing the left-hand side to the right-hand side, and
dividing by t:
t_.. -
0=limitsup E ds + e h(Yt) -h(y)
t-o a
However, If we let Z e6t h(y) ,then
— EZ—z
urnE et h(yt) —h(y) urn °
EdZ
t-0 t0
where EdZ at t =0Is found by Ito's Lemma to be
h'(y)Edy +. hu(y)Var dy -h(y)
t -•s
This, combined with urn Ie ds =1/a gives (2.14). a
The theorem states that there will be regions of values for y where
h(y) >y8Mand no stopping is optimal, and other regions where stopping is
optimal and h(y) =YaM.Condition (2.16) is the "smooth pasting" condition
11which requires that h(y) be differentiable at the boundaries of regions
where h(y)MYa.
In the next Section we show that there is only one connected region
where h(y) >YaM,and we characterize the optimal portfolio rules.
123. Optimal Portfolio and Consumption Rules
We begin by showing that the Consumer chooses a mean-variance efficient
portfolio. This result does not require that the utility function exhibit
constant relative risk aversion.




Proof:This follows immediately from Theorem 2.2, and the fact, proved
in the Appendix ,that <0,by substituting (2.14b) into
(2.14a) and maximizing with respect to x.
Since all consumers hold risky assets in the same proportion (even if
they have different utility functions and values of y), and since financial
market clearing implies that the sum of their holdings must equal the value
of the market portfolio, we obtain the standard (market portfolio based single
factor) capital asset pricing model:
Theorem 3.2 Let rm be the instantaneous return on the market portfolio
(i.e., a portfolio where thei financial asset has weight 6/6 ), 1j=i
.i




Proof: Recall that x(y) =X(y),sothat (3.1) ImplIes that
X(y) =s(y,K) ,wheres(y,K) is a positive scalar which depends on
the consumer's tastes, y and K. This can be summed over consumersto yield
=
,wheres2 is a positive scalar and is the vector of




and these two equations combine to give the result to be proved, since is
a matrix with (i.j) element equal to Cov(d61 / ,d6I 6)
Theorem3.2 allows us to change the control In (2.9), (2.10), (2.14) and
(2.15) from the vector x to a scalar x which denotes the amount invested
In the market portfolio. Note that (2.6) gives the mean rate of return p
and variance a2ofthe market portfolio. Therefore, (3.1) becomes
(3.2) x(y) =______
andVar dy =x2a2and Edy =r(y+X-1)+xp in (2.14b)
In order to understand why the consumption based asset pricing model
fails in our context it is necessary to further. characterize the optimal
consumption policy. The next theorem states that the optimal consumption
policy is characterized by three numbers y1, y, and y2 with the property
that y1 y2 and if the statevariable y Is between y1 and y2,
then the house is not sold; if y is not between y1 and y2, then the
house Is sold and a new house Is purchased to bring the level of the state
variable from y to y*•
Theorem 3.3: There exists three numbers y y*y2 such that h(y)in
Theorem 2.2 satisfies
h(y) >Mya if and only if e(y1,y2)
and




To understand this recall that y =— A.Ifthe financial assets rise
in value, then Q will rise and eventually the consumer will feel
sufficiently wealthy that he wants a larger house. When Q rises to the
point where yy2 ,theconsumer purchases a house K*(Q) with the property
that his new ratio of wealth to housing QIK*(Q) satisfies
(34) Q/(*(Q) -X
A similar effect appears on the downside. If wealth falls sufficiently, then
the old house will be sold and a new house will be purchased which satisfies
(3.4). Note that the size of the new house depends only on the total wealth
Q. Note that If was the level of wealth just before switching houses,
then the Q in (3.4) Is -
XK_.
We are now in a position to give a complete mathematical description of
the solution. Using (3.2) and (2.14), we seek a function h(.) and numbers
H, y1, y, y2 such that
(3.5) -
[j () +r(y+A-1)h(y) -Th(y)+= 0
for y e[y1, y2] ;
(3.6) h(y) YM for all y ;
and from (2.16)
(3.7) h(y1) =yH for I =1,2 ;
(3.8) h'(y1) =ayM for I =1,2 ;
and from (3.4)
15(3.9) M =(y*+X)ah(y*) =(+Yh(y)
To understand this system fix M and ignore (3.9). Equations (3.7)
and (3.8) represent 2 free boundary conditions for the second order
differential equation (3.5). Such a system can be understood by picking a
guess for y1, then usIng (3.7) and (3.8) to get h(y1) and h'(y1). This
provides an Initial condition to (3.5). Then (3.5) can be continued while
h(y) >YMuntil a point y2 is found where h(y2) =yM. If it Is also
the case that h'(y2) =ayM, then we are done, otherwise choose a new
value of y1 and repeat. If a solution can be found, then for the fixed M,
we will have a solution to (3.5) -(3.8):h(y; M). This function is then





The value for is the y which attains the supremum In (3.10).
We do not have an analytic solution to (3.5)-(3.9); however, the appendix
shows that there exists a solution and the next Section presents numerical
simulations of the solution. In addition, we prove that as transaction costs
increase, the interval over which no house sale occurs (y1, y2) grows:
Theorem 3.4: If y1, y2, M solve (3.5) -(3.9),then y1 is a strictly
decreasing function of X, and y2 is a strictly increasing function of A.
If M >1I(ag),thenM is a strictly decreasing function of A.
Note that M =1/ (as) when it is optimal to never sell a house, starting
from y = ,i.e. =1A,x(y*) =0and neither y1 nor y2 are ever
reached starting from y =y
16Though we cannot explicitly solve for h(.), substituting (3.2) into
(3.5) and differentiating once can be used to show that x(y) satisfies
the following differential equation
2
(3.11) x'(y)x(y) +r-- x(y)
- (y +x - 1)=
2a a
Theorem 3.5 Let
for y (y1, y2)
(3.13) 2 +2
[




for some real number c0. Note that y [0, 1]
To understand (3.14) make a change of
(z) =x(z+1—X),so (3.14) becomes
variable to z =y+X-1and
(3.15) ((z)—G1z) ((z)—02z)1' =cfor z €(z1, z2)
where z1y1 +A-1and z2 =y2
+A-1.
Figure 1 plots the lines =
01z/ (z+1) and
plotted, for 3 values of A,Is the curve (z)
above these two lines. As c goes to zero, the
the curve formed by the two lines =
01z
and
(z) / (z+1) represents the fraction of wealth
17
x =/(z+1). Also
/ (z+1) which lies
curve (z) collapses onto
= Note that
X/Q Invested in the risky
(3.12)
and let O <o 2>0be the two roots of the seconddegree equation
Then the
(3.14a)
optimal x at y, x(y) satisfies:
x(y) >Max(e1(y+X-1),02(y+A-1))asset. Note that from (2.1) and (2.8), z =(X+B)IK,and thus unlike
y, z is a description of the state independent of A. Hence, the reaction
of the x(z) to a change In A tells us how the holdings of risky assets
change in a particular state when A changes.
Note that the left—hand side of (3.15) is independent of A (i.e.,
e, e and y do not depend on A). Therefore, if we compare the solutions
to two identical optimization problems, except that ) a in one and
A =Ain the other, then only c can be different across the two
problems. If we denote the optimal value of (z) by x(z; A) to Indicate
its dependence on A, then the previous remarks Imply that (z; Xa) is
either everywhere above or everywhere below (z; Ab) for the range of z's
where (3.15) holds. We do not know that c varies monotonically with A.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 where Aa >
Aband (z; Xa) lies
everywhere below (z, Ab). Note, however, that there are values for
>'a which are larger than (•;Ad).For example x(zia; Aa) >
x(z;Ab) for all z €EZ1b Z2b). Note that if A = thenz Zia is not
an attainable point in the state space since the consumer sells his house at
any state below Zib.
The above remarks indicate that the effect of A on the holdings of
risky assets is complex, and dependent on the particular state that the
consumer Is in. Roughly speaking, the existence of transactions costs makes
the consumer more risk averse in the middle of his state space (i.e., near
=y*)and less risk averse at the boundaries of his state space (y=y1 or
This can be understood by noting that the consumer's direct utility
function Mya is replaced by his indirect utility function h(y) for
purposes of asset choice. Figure 2 illustrates the consequences of this by
plotting h(y) -Mya.Note that the smooth pasting conditions assure that
18h(y) is tangent to MYa at y =y1and y =y2.As the Figure shows,
this Implies that h(y) Is less concave than MYa at these points. (The
curve may not appear tangent at y1, but it is tangent; the second
derivative of h(y) -MYaIs quite large just to the right of y1.) Clearly
however, h(y) must become more concave than MYa somewhere between y1 and
To explore this further, note that
'3 16' x(y) X
'. ' y Q-XK'
gives the proportion of marketable wealth invested In the risky asset. If
X =0,then our model is equivalent to Merton's model where the proportion
of wealth invested in the risky asset is
(3.17) 2
(1-a)a









Therefore, the consumer behaves In a more risk averse manner just after
purchasing a new house, and In a less risk averse manner just before
purchasing a new house.
194. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
The boundary value problem (3.5)-(3.9) can be solved on a computer using
roughly the technique described in Section 3 just after (3.9). We make the
following assumptions about parameters: The mean and standard deviation of
the excess return on the market portfolio are 5.9% and 22% respectively
from Ibbotson and Sinquefeld (1982).
Since the durable good is the numeraire, the nominal inflation on durable
goods should be subtracted from the nominal rate of interest to get the
appropriate real rate, rf .Ibbotsonand Sinquefeld report an average short
run rate of 4.3% between 1953 and 1979. In the same period the nominal
inflation in housing prices was 4.2% per year, and 2.5% per year for
automobiles.!1 We thus, somewhat arbitrarily, set the risk free rate rf
to be 1%.
Table 1 presents some numerical results for the case of no depreciation
(= 0),=rf.and for various values of A, and of A1-a which is the
coefficient of relative risk aversion. In order to define state variables
independent of A, we let
(4.1) y+A=Q/K.
Column 3 gIves the left boundary S1.andthe right boundary y2 of the no
stopping region. It also gives the point to which Q/K is brought
after hits a boundary point.
Column 4 presents the expected length of time between house purchases.
Following Karlin and Taylor [1981, p.192) let T be the length of time
it takes to hit a boundary starting from y, and
(4.2) Va(Y) =ET
20Then Va( ) satisfies the following differential equation
(4.3) -1 =V(y)Edy +V(y) Var dy
with boundary conditions Va(Yi) =Va(Y2)
=0
This is solved numerically, and V(y*) appears in the table.
The fifth column presents the result of numerical calculations on the
average holding of risky assets. The fraction of wealth invested in the
risky asset is a function of the state y. This state is a renewal process
which goes from y to a boundary and then returns. Karlin and Taylor
[1981, pp.192, 261] shows that the expected value of any function f(•) of
the state, can be found by solving the differential equation
(4.4) -f(y) =V(y)Edy +. V(y)Var Y
for Vb(.) with boundary conditions V(y1) =Vb(Y2)
=0.
The average value of f(.) over renewal cycles Is Vb(y*) I Va(y*)






which represents the fraction of total wealth invested in risky assets.
The sixth column uses wealth net of the transactions cost of selling the
durable to compute the average fraction of wealth held in the form of the
risky asset. This Is computed by setting f(y)x(y)/y In the previous
calculation.
The seventh column gives the value of X/Q In the absence of transactions
cost (I.e. in Merton's model), as it appears in (3.17).
The eighth column gives the probability that the consumer will reach the
lower boundary before reaching the upper boundary, given that he starts from
y = .Itthus gives the fraction of occasions that a change in the value
of the stock market causes people to buy smaller houses, rather than larger
houses.
21The ninth (and final) column gives the rate of drift in wealth evaluated
at It is computed as E dy =1x(y)+(y+X-1)r
Discussion of Table 1.
As is expected, a rise in transactions cost Increases the average time
between durable sales. The average time between durable sales is quite
large even for very small transactions costs. Note that in this Infinite
horizon model, If risky assets were not held (i.e., if .i= 0)and r =
thenthe consumer starting from y would never switch. He would Invest
all of his wealth In housing and consume the service flow. It Is the
uncertainty about stock returns and the upward drift in wealth when i> 0
that causes the boundaries to be hit.
In particular, with 6 =.01,r =.01and =.059and the range of
risk aversions being considered, the returns from saving In the form of
financial assets are so large that the consumer chooses a lifetime consumption
profile which (on average) drifts upward. To accomplish this he chooses a
relatively small durable and relatively large financial investments with the
property that his wealth drifts upward in the period between durable
purchases.'
Hence, the major reason for durable sales Is the upward drift in wealth.
As the final column of the Table makes clear, the parameters chosen imply that
wealth is expected to rise at a rate of, say, 6.22% for A =1.1and
X =.05just after a new durable purchase has been made.
It should be emphasized that we are considering durable good sales caused
only by changes in wealth; not caused, by death, switching of jobs or spouses,
or changes in family size. The point to realize is that changes in stock
market wealth will be associated with consumption changes for an individual
only when measured over decades; there is essentially no covarlance between
22consumption changes and stock returns on a monthly or annual basis for
realistic measures of transactions cost.
The Table shows that the average fraction of wealth invested in risky
assets, X/Q, falls as transactions costs rise. For A =2.0,the
average holdings of risky assets falls from .584 at X =.005to .460
at X =.25;in each case it is substantially lower than the no
transactions cost case where X =0
The next column on the Table, labeled (ETY1 EX/(Q-XK) ,alsocomputes
the average fraction of "wealth" invested in the risky asset, but "wealth"
refers to the amount of money that would be realized if all assets and
durables were liquidated. This measure of wealth depends on the level of
transactions cost. The table shows that the average fraction invested in
risky assets Is not a monotone function of A .WhenA is large, "wealth"
falls and this makes it appear as if a large fraction of "wealth1' is invested
in the risky asset.
It is interesting to note that, for a given A ,asthe consumer
becomes less risk averse (i.e., A falls) the average holdings of risky
assets gets closer to the =0risky asset level. We understand this to
be caused by the fact that when A falls the consumer holds more risky
assets, and hence spends more time near the boundaries of his "no stopping"
region. (Note the Er falls as A falls.) The transactions cost causes
him to be less risk averse near the boundaries than he would be if A =0
as noted in Section 3.
Discussion of Tables 2, 3, and 4
These tables consider the same parameters as Table 1, except that 6 is
raised to 2%, 4%, and 6%: in Tables 2, 3 and 4 respectively. It
may be thought that raising the discount rate lowers the average time between
23durable sales. The reasoning may be that when the discount rate is high
then the consumer should take advantage of a rise In wealth to increase
his consumption sooner rather than later. A comparison of Table 2 and
Table 1 shows that this is not the case. Instead, the dominant effect
appears to be that a rise In the discount rate to 2% lowers investment In
financial assets (as can be seen by comparing G1,*,2)acrossthe two
tables), and this lowers the rate of upward drift in wealth.
Table 4 ,inwhich 6 =6%,showsthat the investment In financial
assets falls to the point where the expected drift In wealth is almost zero
just after a new durable is purchased. For such parameter values, the
purchase of a durable, in the steady state, is due to variability in wealth
rather than the drift in wealth. The expected time between purchases Is very
large, far larger than f or the 6 =1%of Table 1. Thus, for a consumer
in a steady state (i.e., where wealth would not be expected to drift after
a purchase), the variability of the stock market would not be correlated
with an infinitely long lived consumers durable purchase except at
frequences of many decades.
Discussion of Table 5
The previous discussion concerned situations where the durable does not
depreciate. If the durable depreciates rapidly, then there will be very
frequent purchases. The first column of Table 5gives various annual
depreciation rates of the durable good from =0to =.10.Note that
the average fraction of wealth invested in the risky asset becomes very
close to Its X =0value when a is large. Further, it should be clear
that consumption will be a more responsive function of wealth when rapid
depreciation causes new purchases to occur very frequently.
24Notes:=0,rF =.01,=0.01,t= .059,a =.22
bOXIs the percenttransactions costofsellingtheolddurable;
A1-a Isthe coefficientofrelativeriskaversion;
'2) arethe three values of Q/K which characterize optimal
stopping;



























.0262 .005 2.0 (.34, 0.58, 0.89)
.25 2.0 (.40, 0.92, 2.54)47.420.4600.6040.610.022 .0293
.05 2.0 (.29, 0.70, 1.43)28.940.5300.5700.610.093 .0258
.05 1.75 (.27, 0.71, 1.56)27.330.6090.6540.697.100 .0313
.05 1.5 (.26, 0.76, 1.81)25.640.7170.7680.813.107 .0391
.05 1.1 (.26, 1.08, 3.16)22.391.0151.0691.108.121.0622
.05 0.9 (.44, 2.56, 8.71)20.461.3031.3351.354.129 .0845
.005 0.9 (.76, 2.03, 4.38)7.8321.3421.3451.354.261 .0840
.25 0.9 (.39, 3.62, 18.30)35.081.2201.3421.354.042 .0875
.08 2.0 (.30, 0.74, 1.65)33.930.5110.5700.610.069 .0262
.08 1.75 (.28, 0.76, 1.82)32.170.5870.6540.697.074 .0317
.08 1.5 (.26, 0.81, 2.12)30.160.6930.7680.813.082 .0397
.08 1.1 (.26, 1.17, 3.78)26.490.9891.0681.108.095 .0630
.08 0.9 (.40, 2.78, 10.56)24.191.2861.3341.354.103.0849
.10 2.0 (.31, 0.77, 1.77)36.480.5010.5720.610.058.0264
.10 1.75 (.29, 0.79, 1.97)34.620.5770.6560.697.063 .0321
.10 1.5 (.27, 0.85, 2.31)32.490.6800.7700.813.070 .0402
.10 1.1 (.27, 1.22, 4.14)28.500.9751.0691.108.083 .0635






Is the average fraction of wealth Invested in the risky
asset, using the steady state distribution under the
optimal policy;
Is the same as (EtY' EX/Q except that "wealth refers
to the amount which is obtained net of transactions cost
when all assets and durables are sold.
is the value of X/Q in the absence of transactions cost.
Is the prob that is reached from rbefore
is reached;
Rate of Drift


























.0212 .005 2.0(.274, 0.465, 0,711)
.25 2.0(.375, 0.796, 2.162)56.900.4030.5650.610.050 .0245
.05 2.0(.247, 0.576, 1.169)32.060.5040.5520.610.142.0210
.05 1.75(.226, 0.573, 1.243)30.150.5780.6340.697.149.0257
.05 1.5(.206, 0.581, 1.371)28.040.6780.7450.813.157.0326
.05 1.1(.179, 0.674, 1.935)24.200.9511.0361.108.171 .0533
.05 0.9(.185, 0.909, 3.038)21.951.2061.2921.354.179.0737
.005 0.9(.262, 0.691, 1.480)8.021.3161.3261.354.302 .0724
.25 0.9(.307, 1.369, 6.658)39.811.0171.2921.354.083 .0816
26Table3
















.383 (.198, .338, 0.513) 12.58
2.0.25(.344, .662,1.753) 81.910.2960.478 0.610.208
2.0.05(.195, .443, 0.883) 37.950.4540.517 0.610.297
1.75.05(.175, .428, 0.911) 35.350.5180.594 0.697.301
1.5.05(.156, .415, 0.959) 32.430.6030.697 0.813.305
1.1.05(.125, .412, 1.153) 27.400.8290.967 1.108.311
0.9.05(.113, .440, 1.421) 24.431.0321.200 1.354.315
0.9.005(.118, .309, 0.652) 8.311.2651.289 1.354.393
0.9.25(.276, .736, 3.362) 50.610.7061.144 1.354.234
= 0.059,a =0.22
x
E 0-AK A =0
E(r) X/Q
Table 4






































































































.121 .0622 .00(0.26, 1.08, 3.16)
.01(0.54, 1.86, 4.90)16.32 1.048 1.0781.108.114.0714
.02(0.84, 2.59, 6.46)13.26 1.063 1.0831.108.099 .0811
.03(1.14, 3.28, 7.93)11.34 1.071 1.0871.108.084.0908
.04(1.46, 3.94, 9.32) 9.92 1.077 1.0901.108.071.1006
.05(1.77, 4.60, 10.67) 8.84 1.082 1.0931.108.059.1105
.06(2.08, 5.23, 12.01) 8.00 1.085 1.0951.108.049.1203
.07(2.40, 5.85, 13.29) 7.28 1.088 1.0961.108.041 .1302
.08(2.73, 6.47, 14.55) 6.66 1.090 1.0981.108.034.140
.09(3.06, 7.07, 15.83) 6.16 1.092 1.0991.108.029.150
.10(3.37, 7.67, 17.09 5.73 1.0941.1001.108.023.160
285. CONCLUSIONS
In the model, it Is optimal for consumers to have a target level y* for
the ratio y(Q—XK) I K of liquid wealth to durable size. Further, there
are two numbers y1 and y2 such that only if y y1 or yy2, will the
consumer sell his current durable K to return y to the level y, by
purchasing a new durable K*(Q) which satisfies =Q/ K(Q) -
Animportant implication of the model is that the new size of the durable
purchased depends only on wealth. Therefore, to the extent that wealth
changes are unpredictable, changes in the size of new durable purchases will
be unpredictable. This was pointed out by Bar-han and Blinder (1986),
who used this idea to test an illiquid durable goods model against the
standard permanent income (i.e. no transactions cost) model of
consumption which had been tested by Hall (1978) and Flavin(1981).
They noted that the average size of the new car purchased at date t is a
proxy for K*(Q) and that changes in this variable should be unpredictable.
Indeed they find this correct for automobile purchases. They also note that
when one looks at the number of new cars purchased, then changes in this
variable should be predictable. Our model cannot be directly applied to
evaluate such a statement without modelling the aggregation over consumers.
However, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the number of consumers who
arrive at a boundary at time t will depend on the level of durables they
each hold at time t, and this in turn will depend on the history of prior
durable purchases. Therefore, changes in the number of people purchasing new
automobiles should be forecastable using information on the prior levels of
purchases. They indeed find this to be the case. Therefore, by
distinguishing the number of people making new purchases from the average
size of each purchase, it appears to be possible to test predictionsof this
29model which are absent from the standard model as well as from the quadratic
adjustment cost model of the type studied by Bernanke (1985) and the convex
adjustment cost model of Eichenbaum and Hansen (1985). Clearly, further work
needs to be done on the aggregation problem before such tests can be made
precise.
Another area in which further work is needed is in modelling the
problems associated with multiple types of consumption goods, each of which
has a possibly different transactions cost. In assuming one type of
consumption good we ignore the issue of substitution between low transactions
cost and high transactions cost goods, and In particular that such
substitution might lead a change in wealth to cause an excessive movement In
the purchases of low transactions cost goods.
We also ignore the possibility that there are various types of durable
goods which are purchased at staggered dates by a given consumer. In such
a situation the consumer may be purchasing some durable good almost every
month.It would be interesting to know the correlation between consumption
service flows and stock returns in such a model.
It should be recognized that many goods which our national income accounts
consider to be noridurables, actually have a large "durable° component. This
is obvious for categories such as clothing and shoes. However, many
nondurables are used in almost fixed proportions with durables, and this
creates a transaction cost not dissimilar to that studied here. For example,
changing the level of food consumption may have transactions cost, If for
example, one has to find different friends with whom to go to better
restaurants, or learn about better foods to buy in grocery stores. (Some
people even live in areas for which eating better food would require them to
change jobs and move out of town.) Changing the level of gasoline, or
30electricity might require selling an automobile, home, or changing a living or
work location.
We have shown that small costs of changing consumption levels can lead
consumption to be insensitive to wealth for long periods. This makes the
consumption based asset pricing model inappropriate for predicting asset
risk premia. However, we show that market portfolio (i.e. wealth) based
measures of risk premia continue to be appropriate even in the presence of
consumption transactions costs.
31Footnotes
The CCAPM was rejected In tests performed in Hansen and Singleton
[1982 and 1983]. Mankiw and Shapiro [1984] compare the adequacy of the
CCAPM with the CAPM and find that the later performs better. The
most favorable evidence for the CCAPM appears in Breeden, Gibbons and
Litzenberger [1986], where the unconditional form of the CCAPM is
evaluated.
These observations are based upon Grossman, Melino and Shiller [1985].
See Constantlnides[1986] for results regarding proportional transaction
costs in security trading and a survey of work on security transaction
costs. See Harrison and Taylor [1978], and Richard [1977] for related
work on the optimal stopping of a controlled diffusion.
,Tosee this, note that in any neighborhood of (Q,K) in which V is twice






Clearly V1 > 0.IfV1 0 ,thenthis equation can only hold if
V11 =0.Insuch a case any value of X is optimal. If V1 >0
then the equation requires that V11 <0and the optimal portfolio
—V
satisfies X v—1 I_1.
11
Economic Report of the President 1980, pp.260-261. See Stambaugh [1982]
for a discussion of real returns on various durables and assets.
This is analogous to what would occur in a certainty mode with r >6
There, both consumption and wealth would "drift" upward at the same rate.
327IBar—Ilan and Blinder analyzed a model without uncertainty, but their
insights can be directly applied to the model of this paper.
Caplin and Spulber (1985) consider a model with fixed transactions costs
where aggregation over consumers causes the model to behave in many ways
like a representative agent model without transactions cost. We do not
expect a similar result here because starting from cross-sectional
distribution of consumer state variables, at time 0, the cross—sectional
distribution at time t (and thus the density of house purchases) will
depend on the history of the stock market between 0 and t. In the
Caplin and Spulber model this is not the case because random shocks are
always of the same sign so it is as if the cross-sectional distribution of
characteristics revolves In one direction around a circle; always
maintaining the same density at each point.
To extend the analysis to the case of several assets, take
—1=I•
= x"I'
The argument of Footnote 4, transposed to the proof of Lemma 2, shows that the
optimal portfolio is proportional to
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35APPENDIX
Most of the Appendix deals with the optimization problem (2.9) -(2.12)
of Section 2. However, as a preliminary step we prove Theorem 2.1
concerning the value function V(Q,K). Further, to simplify notations, we
consider the case of a single risky asset with drift +rfand
Instantaneous variance a2 (we indicate in footnotes how to extend the
analysis to the case of several assets, where appropriate).
Proof of theorem 2.1:
1)It is always possible for the agent to sell immediately
his current durable good, and to invest all his wealth Q —AKinto
a house to be kept for all t0 ,withoutundertaking any financial
operation in the future =
KtX =0for all t0 ). If a >0
this gives:
V' K' >(Q_XK)a "'/ ' a(S+ac)
and v2(+aa)1 .If a <0,thenconsider the strategy of setting
0 and buying a new house every year. If r >0and A <1then
this strategy will do at least as well as when r =0and A =1.Thus,
assume that Q -AKis moved to an economy where henceforth r =0and
x =1.In year n a fraction g of Q -AKis invested in housing,
where 6n 6
g=e 1-e
It is easily verified that g(0,1)and g, =1,since a <0.
n=0
It follows that setting K(n) =(Q-xK)g















A =0,Vdoes not depend on K ,andQ
while K and X are control variables.
model of consumption and portfolio choice
(2.3) are linear in (Q,K,X) and since
becomes the only
It is thus identical













the solution, if it exists, must be, by homogeneity, of the form
where v =V(1).Thismodel has been studied by Karatzas, et.al.
p.290] who show that (our) >0is sufficient to ensure that v
where it Is crucial to note that we require 0 ,andif =0
then the process is stopped and the consumer gets u(0) .TheBellman
differential equation is
(A 1) sup ____
(K,X)
V°(Q) +(rFQ
-(rF)K+X)V'(Q) -6V(Q)+ = 0




If B >0,then(A.2) can be solved for v ,andthus there is a solution
to (A.1).
Since the consumer is obviously better off when X =0than when X >0,
it follows that V(Q,K). Q.E.D.
The rest of the Appendix solves the optimization problem (2.9) -(2.12).
Given the state (or our knowledge...) of the mathematical literature, we have
been lead to take a rather roundabout approach.
First for fixed M, the optimization problem in (2.9) —(2.11)Is of the
form studied by Krylov (1980). There are however two Important differences.
Krylov assumes that (i)Xt is bounded and bounded away from zero, I.e.,
there are two numbers h >c> 0, with h Xtt, and (ii) t belongs
to a bounded state space, in the sense that there are numbers yLyhyL <
such that if =y'or If =h,thenthe consumer is forced to stop
(i.e. setr =0).To solve the problem, we proceed as follows. We define an
auxiliary problem, with artificial bounds, which satisfies the assumptions of
Krylov, and we let h go to Infinity and c go to zero. Lemma 1, based on
a result of Krylov, shows that this procedure is justified: the value of the
auxiliary problem converges uniformly to the value of the limit problem.
Lemmas 2, 3 and 4 characterIze the solution and the optimal strategy of the
auxiliary problem. Remark 1 shows that for large enough the upper bound
in (I) is not binding. The first part of the proof is concluded by Lemma5,
whichdescribes the solution of the optimization problem (2.9) -(2.11)for
fixed M under the assumption (ii), by taking the limit of the optimal
strategies of the auxiliary problems.
3The second part of the proof uses (2.12) to find M. Lemmas 6and 7
show how the values obtained at the end of the first partvary with M
and X, and Lemma 8 characterizes the solution of the problem underthe
constraint (ii) yZtyh•Itis only at this late stage in Lemma 9,
that we are able to show that, for y small enough and large enough,
(ii) is not binding so that we can dispense from it.
We first study an auxiliary problem where the following constraintsare
added to the optimization In (2.9) —(2.10),M is a real number of the same




=yh Implies h(y;M) =My
y =yt impliesh(y;M) =My
Note that h(y;M) a priori depends on (e, y2• yh)• We have only made
explicit its dependency In c. We let h(y;M) denote the solution of the
auxiliary problem with c equal to zero.
Lemma 1. When c converges to zero, the function h(y;M) converges
uniformly to h(y;M) [yt,yh] and h(y;M) is continuous in M.
Proof of Lemma 1. The assumptions of Krylov 198O,p. 130] are
satisfied. We apply corollary 13, p. 138. Corollary 13 applies in fact
to:
h(y,T;M) sup E [j etdt +eMy]
t<T,(xt) 0
4and states that h(y,T;M) converges uniformly to h(y,T;M), and that both
are continuous in M. We have
ih(y;M) -h(y,T;M)i< supIh(y;M)i <esuplM(y+A)aI
y y
h(y;M) -h(y,T;M)i<e6sup ih(y;M)i <e61SUPIM(Y+X)aI
y y
and the difference can be made as small as one wishes for T large enough






The first and third terms go (uniformly) to zero by the preceding
inequalities while the second term converges uniformly to zero by corollary 13
of Krylov. Q.E.D.
We now proceed to study the auxiliary problem.
Lemma 2: h(y;M) is continuously differentiable in y on •For
laq enough, c and small enough, for M <(1—X)vthere
exists an Interval (y,y) with y <y
,suchthat:
(I) h(y;M) is twice continuously differentiable and h(y;M) >MY
on (y,y) ; (1-x)(1-a) rIB belongs to (y,y)
(ii) h(y;M) =MYaon the complement of in[2.h]
M >(l_A)-aV,h
(y;M) =MYa tyL,yh
Proof of Lemma 2: It is Immediate to check that the auxiliary
problem satisfies the assumptions of Krylov [1980, p. 22). Therefore,
by Krylov's Theorem 3, his a continuously differentiable function of y
for y[y,h] and dropping the arguments of the function h while
5using h'and h" for the first and second derivatives with respect to y
C C












+ r(y+x-1)h'- += 0








(A 7) -1 + r(y-+-X-1)h'-h+1=0; c ca a c
if







(A 9) -— r(y+x-1)h
- + 0
0
Note that (A.7) can be rewritten as:
6(A.1O) G(h,h,h,Y) =0







Since aM >0,by(2.13), g(y) is increasing for





Therefore, by (2.13), g() is strictly positive for M <(l_XyaV
The proof of the lemma uses the following remark: j
y y 2(1-a)e /.i andh(y) =MYathen g(y)0 .Theremark is
true because h(z) MZ all z ,thusfor y h(y) =MYawe have
h(y) =aMyaand h(y) a(a -1)MYa_2
where h(y) refers to the derivative computed from the interior of the









sothat (A.7) holds, which implies, using (A.10) and (A.11), that g(y) 0
7Since g() >0and c can be chosen sufficiently small that >y
the preceding remark implies hG;M) > .ThatIs, (9h) can be
chosen to include .Let(y, 4)bethe largest interval containing
such that h(y;M) >MYa.Bythe foregoing remark, we have
y )yimplies h(y;M) My and g($) 0
h(y;M) = andg($) 0
Now the shape of the function g(y) implies that g(y) <0for y <y
and y >4 providedwe choose y small enough so that (Y) <0.(Note
that g(y) as Y —'0.)We use this fact to prove part (11) of the
lema by contradiction. Suppose there was another interval (yji Y)
disjoint from (y, 4)suchthat h(y) >MYafor y In (Yj Y).
Note that h(y) = aty =yLand ,= yh•Therefore,there is at






It follows that g(y') >0,since either (A.7) or (A.9) holds at y',
and this contradicts the fact that g(y) <0on the complement of (y, 4).
Finally,for M >(l-A)v,g(y)is negative for all y. If (y, 4)
wasnot empty, the maximizer y' of h(y;M) -MYaon [y, 4]would
satisfy g(y1) >0,a contradiction. Q.E.D.
It will be very useful to get a precise description of the shape
of the optimal policy x(y) on (y ,4) . Thisinvolves a careful analysis
8of the differential equation (3.11). The following Lemma uses the notation of
(3.12)—(3.14).
Lemma 3:a solution of (3.11) has one of the three possible following
shapes in the positive orthant:
(1) 0 < x(y) < 01(y+X-1), x'(y) < 0, x"(y) < 0, defined only on a
subset of [0,1-A],
(ii) x(y) > Max(01(y+X—1), 0(y+X-1)), x'(y) > 0,
(111) 0 < x(y) < e2(y+x—1), x'(y) > 0, xu(y) < 0, defined on a subset of
[1—X,+oo).




x -(y+X—1)x' 1+,- j.1y+X-1—2ry+X—12
x 2i x2 xi
2a a
which implies, by definition of 0 and 02, that for x > 0:
x° < 0 for O < y+-1 < 0 •i.e.,x" < 0 either when
x < 01 (y+X-1) ,andy < 1-A
or when x > e2(y+X-1), and y > 1-A ;
x'1 > 0 for x > Max[01(y+X-1), 2(y+A-1)].
Finally (3.11) gives the sign of x'. Q.E.D.
Remark 1: The preceding analysis allows to justify that can be chosen
large enough so that the upper bound is not attained by the optimal strategy.
By Krylov [1980, p.39, Theorem 3], it Is always true, even if the upper
bound is attained, that h(y;M) Is twice continuously differentiable onthe
set C and the argument at the end of Lemma 2 shows that there is always a
point y In [yZ,yhl] such that:
9- C 1Y
ah"a(1—a)
Letting >viax(Cyh ,, thisimplies that the continuous
function x(y) satisfies (A.6) on a nonempty subset of The shape
of the solution of (A.6), as deduced from Lemma 3 shows then that h can be
taken large enough so as not to be attained. Precisely, in the cases where
Lemma 3(1) and (iii) are relevant, we can take
x' >Max(01(y2'+X-l), e(yh+1_x))
To tackle the situation where x(y) satisfies Lemma 3 (ii) note that by
Lemma 2 there is always a point y' such that
x(y')
a (1-a)
Let Ebethe maximum value of c such that the convex set
{(x,y)t(x-O1(y+X-1) (x-O2(y+X-1) c}
has a nonernpty intersection with the set ((x,y)ixiy /a2(1—a)}.Let
i =h,2,.be two values taken by x when y equals y1 ,=h,2..along the
curve
(x-e1(y+X-1))1 (x-e2(y+X-1))1 =
Tobe sure that the upper bound is not binding, it suffices then to take
>Max(,h)
We are now In a position to describe the optimal strategy x(y)
associated with the auxiliary problem c.
Lemma 4: x(y) is continuous on (y, y). Furthermore1 for c
small enough, then exist two positive numbers z, z with y <z.z
<y
10such that:
(1) x(y) satisfies (3.11) on (y, z]. x(y) satisfies (3.11) on
[z, y).
(ii) If z <z,
x(y) =con [z, z]. If z =z,then x(y)
satisfies (3.14) on (y, y).
Proof of Lemma 4: When x(y) is larger than c, we have by
substituting (A.6) into (A.7):
x +r(y+X-1)+1/a-h=





Therefore, Lemma 3 gives the shape of x(y) when x(y) >. Now,by




[ , } for1=1,2.
y-y1 a (1—a)
For c small enough, x(y) >c,andthe shape of the solutions of (3.14)
described in Lemma 3 give the desired result. Q.E.D.
This completes the description of the solution of the auxiliary problem
for h = and c >0.UsingLemma 1, we study now the function h(y;M),
letting c go to zero.
Lemma 5: h(y;M) is continuously differentiable strictly increasing in y
[9h] except perhaps at y =1-A.For M <(l—X)v,thereexists
an interval (y1,y2), such that
11(1) h(y;M) >MYaon (y1,y2) h(y;M)is twice Continuously
differentiable on (y1,y2), except perhaps at y =1-x.
= (1—X)(1—a)rIBbelongs to (y1,y2).
(ii) h(y;M) =Myaon the complement of (y1,y2) in (2.,h]Moreover,
the optimal policy x(y), defined on (y1,y2), is a continuous function of y
such that:
x(y) >Max(01(y+X-1),e2(y+A-1))




Proof of Lemma 5: first note that for c >c',h(y;M) <h,(Y;M)all y,
since the space of strategies available increases when c decreases.
Therefore, y decreases with c, while y increases with c. Let y1 be the
limit of y when e goes to zero.
Now let £k, k=1,... be a sequence of positive numbers converging to
zero. Consider the sequence xk(y) of optimal policies associated with
hC(y;M). Considering Lemma 4, two nonexciusive possibilities may
arise: either there exists an infinite subsequence (same notation) along
which z =z,or there exists an infinite subsequence (same notation
again) along which z <z.
In the first case, let c be an accumulation
point of the c, and x(y) be defined as a solution, limit of xC(y),
of (3.14) on (y1,y2). In the second case, similarly take an accumulation
point' of (ce, zr) and let x(y) be the limit of xC(y),
solution of (3.14) in (y1,z1j with constant c1, equal to zero in [zl,z2],
and solution of (3.14) in z2,y2), with constant c2.
Let the upper limit of h (y;M) be denoted by:
k
12H(y;M) =E
[j edt + et My]
where dy =x(y)db + r(y+X-1) dt
and r =firsttime Yt leaves the interval (y1,y2).
By Lemma 4, H(y:M) =h(y;M).
The next step is to prove that h(y;M) is strictly increasing in y,
on (Y1.Y2). Recall that:




where the supremurn Is taken over all the non-anticipatory strategies t,
(xt). Let y be in (y1,y2), y1 -A,and for any random event w, let
(x(w)), r'(w)) be the optimal strategy followed by the consumer. Let
y' > y, and for each w, consider the value obtained by the agent starting
at y' when he uses the non-anticipatory strategy (x(w)), w'(w). When
=+o, hegets 1/as, with both initial conditions. When t'(w) <






where Yy() is the value taken by the solution of the deterministic
differential equation
dz =x(w)db(w) + r(z+X-1)dt
at date t =t'(w);It is strictly bigger than rY(w) since at date 0,
13y' > y and at each date t dz -dz1=r(z
-z')dt.Since H(y;M) =Ma
on the complement of (y1,y2) in [2.h] this proves that h(y;M) is
strictly increasing on
To complete the proof, we show that the domain[z11z2] on which x(y)
is equal to zero is at most reduced to a point. In fact, if not,
h(y;M) would be twice continuously differentiable on (z1,z2) and by Ito's
formula, one would have
2
sup [i— hx2 + (ry +xt -r(1-X))h'—h+ =0
x>0
and the sup would be obtained for x =0.This implies h" < 0, h' < 0,
a contradiction with the fact that h is strictly increasing.




z2,h(y;M) is twice continuously differentiable on (y1,y2)
except at z. Taking limits at y1 and y2, using the continuity of x(y)




Let y be the point In [y11y2) which maximizes h(y;M) -Mya.We have:
h'(y*;M) =aMy*a1
and






Therefore the function x(y) is above the half line of equation x =iyI
a2(1-a) for y =y1and y =y2
,andunder this half line at y =yin
14(y1,y2). This implies that x(y) is of the typedescribed in Lemma 3(11),
which In turn shows that z must be equal to (1-A). Q.E.D.
This completes the first part of the proof. We enter the second part of
the proof which consists In looking for a value of M that satisfies (2.12)
and in getting rid of the Inequality y1
The following property is going to be useful.
Lemma 6: Consider the stochastic differential equation
dy =x(y)db +r(y+X-1)dt
where x(y) is a solution of (3.11) satisfying Lemma 2(11), for some initial
condition y0, in (y1, y2).
If y0 <1—A,theny reaches y1 In finite time with a strictly
positive probability.
If y0 >1—A,then y reaches y2 in finite time with a strictly
positive probability.
If y0 =1-Aand x(y0) >0,then y reaches either y1 y2 jj
finite time with a strictly positive probability.
Proof of Lemma 6: It follows from a standard property of regular
diffusion processes: If yj <1—A,thereIs an open interval containing
y0, say (y1, ),onwhich x(y) >c>0.Therefore,the probability
that y hits the boundaries of this interval in finite time is equal to one,
and the probability that y hits y1 before is strictly positive (adapt
e.g. Karlin and Taylor [1981, chapter 15)). A similar argumentapplies
f or y2 when yo >1—A. Q.E.D.
To each M satisfying (2.13), one can associate by Lemma 5 an interval
(y1(t.1),y2(M)) in which the solution h(y;M)of (2.9) under (2.10) and
(2.11) is such that h(y;M) >MYa.Notethat y1(M), y2(M), h(y;M) are
15implicitly functions of x.Wewriteh(y;M)to make this dependence
explicit. To go back to the original problem, an intermediate step is to
study how h(y;M) I M varies with A, holding M fixed.
Lemma 7: For M < (l_X)aV ,ora > 0 (resp. a < 0) ,ify is in
(y1(M),y2(M)), except y * i—x if x(1—A) =0,then h(y;tv1) / M is
strictly decreasing (resp. increasing) in M and strictly increasing
(resp. decreasing) in A. Furthermore, if y is in (M)+A,2y(M)+A)
except y i-x if x(1-X) =0,then h(Y-x;M) / H is strictly
decreasing (resp. increasing) in A.
Proof of Lemma 7: We give the proof when a and M are positive. The
case a < 0, M < 0 can be handled along the same lines. When H > 0, we
have:
.r -t —
h(y;M) =supE feMdt + e a
a
dYt =Xtdb + r(y+A—1) dt
where the supremum is taken over all the nonanticipatory strategies t, (xt).
We use an argument similar to the proof that h(y;M) is increasing in H,
in Lemma 5.
Given y in (y1(M),y2(M)), and any random event w, let (x(w),
T'(w)) be the optimal nonanticipatory strategy followed by the consumer.
t'(w) is strictly positive with probability 1. Therefore, if M is
decreased to H', applying the same strategy leads to a higher value than
hx(YM) I H, since the first term in the expectationis strictly increasing
and the second term is unchanged. Therefore:
h(y;M') I M' > h(y;M) / M
16Similarly, consider X1 >X.Forall y, y 1.-Xif x(1-X) =0,by
Lemma 6, r'(w) Is finite with positive probability. Consider an event w
such that t'(w) <+.Thenapplying the X optimal strategy when A'
prevails gives a higher value to y, and therefore the desired result. This
shows that h(y,M) /MIs strictly Increasing for all y, y 1—xif
x(1—A) =0.
Finally, we study the function h(y-X; M) .Bydefinition:





When A decreases, the Initial condition increases, but (y0+A) stays
constant and, since the differential equation can be rewritten
d(yt+X) =xtdb
+r(yt+A-1)dt,
for any event wy(wA) +Ais equal to yt(w,A') +A'
Therefore, for all y, such that y1-Aif x(1—A) =0,we have for the
A optimal strategy starting at y:
A' <AImplies y(w,A') =y(wX)
+A-A'>y(w+A).
Consequently
h,(y_X';M) >h(y—X;M), since t(w) is finite with strictly
positive probability by Lemma 6. Q.E.D.
To go back to the original problem and characterize the function h(y),
we have to determine how M varies with A through equation (2.12), which
can be rewritten
17(A.13) 1 =sup_a h (z—x;M) / M
when a is positive, the sup being taken on {ziy +A z ) +A}.
Note that the sup is replaced by an inf when a <0
Lemma 8: The function h(y) which solves (3.1) to (3.4) is continuous,
strictly increasing in y, continuously differentiable except perhaps at
y =1-A.There exists an interval (y,y) and a number Mx such that:
(1) h(y) >Ma on (y1,y2) and h(y) is twice continuously
differentiable on (y1,y2) except perhaps at y =1—A.
=(1—A)(1—a)rI belongs to (y1,y2). Mx is strictly decreasing in A,
when it is larger than 1/ia, y is strictly decreasing in A ,andy
is strictly increasing in A
(Ii) h(y) =Ma in the complement in R of (y,y)
Proof of Lemma 8: Let
H(x,M) =sup-a h (z—X;M) / M
z
When a >0,from(A.12) ,H(X,M)tends to +whenM tends to zero.
It is equal to (h / (Yh+X))a for M >(l—X)V.Itis continuous in M
by Lemma 1 and by the theorem of the maximum. Furthermore, by Lemma 7, if
the maximizer z is different from 1 or x(1-X) >0,H is strictly
decreasing in M and In A. Therefore, for A fixed, the solution in M
of equation (A.13)
H(X,M) =1
is unique and a strictly decreasing function of A.
If z =1and x(1-A) =0,H(A,M) =1/aMand therefore M =1/ a
By construction, again for a >0:
18hx(y,Mx) I Mx >n
By Lemma 7, the left-hand side is strictly increasing In X (except perhaps
at y =1—A),which proves that the interval (y1,y2) increases
with A. Q.E.D.
To conclude the proof, we have to show that the solutions that we have
found satisfy (A.4), i.e.:
Lemma 9: For all A ,0A <1,thereexists h >> 0such that:
y >y2'
<
Proofof Lemma 9: We use the fact that for all y1-A,hx
is




where <0and >0are the two roots obtained from (3.13).
Straightforward integrations, with starting points y1 and y2, and
h'(y1) / h(y1) =aI y. lead to:
for 1-X<yy2
h(y)h(y2) [1 + (y+A1)I_T2[(Y+A1)T2 -
(y2+A1)T2]]
where =1-









where =1— isalso positive while 1 - isnegative.
Note that when we let y tend to (1-A) In the two above inequalities
we get:
(A.14) h(1-X)h(y1) [i +T (1-X-y1)
]






To complete the proof, we examine separately y1 and y2.
First y2. If y21 —A,onecan take h =1-A.Otherwise,
(A.14) gives an upper bound for In fact, the right-hand side of the
inequality tends to +wheny1 goes to +fora >0(check that
a I <1by definition of 2 another property of the second degree
equation defining and tends to zero for a <0
Finally, y1 . Similarly,when y1 goes to zero, a >0,the
right—hand side of (A.14) goes to +.Whena <0,h(y)vaby
(2.13), and this Implies that h(y1) tends to -wheny1 tends to zero,
so that the right-hand side of (A.14) tends also to +. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2.2 Is then a direct consequence of Lemmas 3 and 9. Lemmas 8
and 9 imply Theorems 3.3 and 3.4. Theorems 3.5 and 3.6 follow from Lemma 5.
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